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Thinking Disgust Plural 
 
di Robert Rawdon Wilson 
The paper explores the connections between disgust and contempt, arguing that 
contempt as a visceral and intellectual affect emerges out of a knowledge of 
disgust. Just as contempt can constitute a polished performance, so too 
disgusting objects can be transformed into art. 
A small local mythology develops within the particular the aversive ones such 
as disgust.  Scraps of argument, literary reference now cut loose from its 
original context, other peoples’ scholarship preserved in worm-like footnotes, 
borrowed authority and the self-defining authority that comes from 
persuasive analysis, no doubt fleshed out by those mythological bits already 
mentioned, create the local mythology that surrounds our understanding of 
affects.  In this way, visceral affects become elaborated, split into narrative 
capsules and given what may seem to be a striking individuality: Anger, for 
instance, can become outrage; longing (or heartache), nostalgia; fear, terror; 
disgust, contempt. When this happens, what we take to be (in the disordered 
trappings of our chosen mythology) a straight-forward visceral and 
spontaneous affect may undergo a transformation into a complex, theatrical 
and highly allusive performance of what we do feel as an affect and what we 
know, or what we remember, concerning the scope and uses of the affect now 
co-opted for use in our production. 
A half century ago, more or less, I traveled on a French ship from Sydney 
to Panama.  A French steamship line, Messageries-maritimes, operated 
between Marseilles and Sydney carrying copra and multitudes of Australians 
returning home or setting off. Because passengers in steerage class were not 
allowed the freedom to roam, we mostly collected on the afterdeck or, in truly 
lousy weather, in the gruesomely terrible steerage lounge. The day I am now 
recalling was clear and warm, just a bit of tropical breeze to make things 
right.  Entertainment was our own problem. And so on that day a kind of 
circus atmosphere began to develop. A number of young travelers from the 
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United Kingdom were demonstrating gymnastic moves. I watched for a few 
minutes when, quite quickly, something happened, an accident in clothing 
shocked a few, made others laugh, a few to turn away.  Another traveling 
Englishman, a freelance journalist he had informed me, turned his head away 
as if a cobra had suddenly curled upwards beneath his toes. I watched his face 
screw into furrows, his eyes bulging, his nares tightened, his lips pursed 
outwards. He pointed his horn shaped lips towards the deck, unnoticed, I 
believe, by every one except myself, and made hawking noises deep in his 
throat as if on the explosive edge of vomiting, 
At the time, I failed to grasp what I had seen. The incident among the 
gymnasts which had shocked some and made others laugh, had caused an up-
welling of disgust crowned by a contorted, ugly face.  Once I had understood 
the significance of the expression on the man’s face (the “disgust face”), I was 
left with two larger problems: how common is this expression; how important 
is it to the analysis of disgust as a basic, recurring affect. I am not going to 
discuss the disgust face other than as a position on a continuum, a step in the 
creation of a more complex expression, the face of contempt. There is a fairly 
widespread belief that disgust is a commonplace affect, easily recognized and 
obvious in both its identifying aspects and its significance. The “face”, then, 
is a universal characteristic of the human response to rot, stench, loss of 
definitive qualities (the downward decomposition into slime, muck and 
physical indeterminateness). Or, perhaps, it isn’t universal, but only a 
commonplace, a repetition in existence. And, if a commonplace, then it is one 
on the level of aversion.  Aversion may be defined as a barrier between a 
person and a threatening object reeking of its decay and fairly bursting with 
suggestions of infection, disease and death. If I were to claim that disgust, 
and its identifying marks, is universal, I would probably find quite a bit of 
agreement, especially in Social Science departments and among such oddities 
of the academic world as literary theorists. However, not everyone does agree. 
The disgust face imposes a discipline on observers from many different 
angles, but it also imposes a huge problem, not easily solved. The academics 
who seem most often to deny disgust’s putative universality are precisely the 
ones who spend the most time thinking about human difference, the 
Itinera, N. 12, 2016. Pagina 161 
 
Anthropologists. Nearly twenty years ago, Jason Kapalka published an 
interview with three Anthropologists (interlaced so as to create a single 
interview) on the concept of disgust. The Canadian Anthropologist, Jean 
Dibernardi, reflecting on the problem, packages her thought in a minimalistic 
nutshell: «I have a hard time believing in a universal facial expression of 
disgust»1. Great world travelers, comfortable in their bluff ways of thinking, 
Anthropologists are also ever-alert Nominalists. Wary of quick inferences, 
and all intellectual short-cuts, they seldom jump to conclusions.  If they find 
the supposed universality of such concepts as the ‘disgust face’ suspect, then 
perhaps we should pay attention. Universals are shifty concepts. Dancing 
away from definition, they make it hard even while claiming a permanent 
upper hand. 
Another approach to the problem of the disgust face would be to reverse it, 
to stand the problem on its head, The English journalist’s expression that I 
glimpsed on the deck of the French passenger ship was striking, but what 
actual significance did it hold? It was contorted, drawn into furrows, nares 
tightened, eyes cloaked.  Later, I understood that I was not peering briefly 
into an image of the disgust face, but rather into another face, one further 
along the continuum, almost at the furthest end. The face of contempt.  
Beginning with Darwin, the disgust face has been recognized as a natural 
response to something seen, something capable of rousing a “natural” 
response to something unpleasantly aversive, ugly, disgusting. The “face” is 
part of, perhaps a chief part, a spontaneous, but very powerful, response to a 
complex of aversive stimuli.  The face of contempt, always a work of art, winks 
good-humoredly.  
Whatever spontaneous bits still inhabited the face the English journalist 
presented the world, they were hidden in his polished performance. His face, 
now theatrically rehearsed, called attention to something he had seen and 
had not liked. However, the ease with which he brought the detail of his face 
into play also suggested previous encounters, rehearsals with others who 
crossed his path inspiring his loathing, his disgust (but transformed into his 
intricately polished contemptuous face). This is what I have called a “local” 
                                                          
1 J. Kapalka, “Anthropologists on Disgust: 3 Interviews”, Mattoid, 48, 1994, pp. 165-86. 
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mythology.  What is known and felt can be enhanced and expanded, its reach 
deliberately shaped into, borrowing an important phrase from Deleuze and 
Guattari, a personal war machine. A concept, Deleuze observes, is a brick. 
You can build with it. What you have already learned lies ready to be further 
used as conceptual bricks. Consider the journalist’s pursed but open lips. The 
iconography of the disgust face always indicates a response to aversive 
stimuli, the face narrowed and tightened in several ways, blocking entrance 
from objects that display rot, that stink, that indicate the slippage of the 
object from solidity and definite shape into formlessness and uncertain being. 
The Englishman’s lips were pursed in an open fashion, horn-shaped, as if 
preparing to spew filth upon the loathed object of his present experience. The 
hawking noises from deep within his throat added to the impression that he 
felt a strong sensation of disgust, though of course there was little reason to 
believe he had actually felt disgust, but only the desire to be thought that he 
had done so. He had built contempt out of the bricks his knowledge of disgust 
had given him. Still, there was much lacking. For example, his face contorted 
into a judgment, but there was no sneer. His upper lip did not arch to reveal 
an aggressive canine tooth. Even without a sneer, his face was wonderfully 
hostile. Clearly, he had loathed what he had seen. All compound emotions 
are, I think, rich in the uses they make of past experience and the distant 
flutters of memory. Contempt is to disgust as outrage is to anger or nostalgia 
to heartache and longing: a visceral affect enhanced by allusion, elaborated 
and consciously constructed to become an intellectual dimension of the mind. 
It becomes a compound affect, at once visceral and intellectual, drawing from 
raw experience of the primary affect and, ransacking the local mythology, the 
memories of personal experience, books and films. 
Disgusting objects can be transformed into art. It may not be easy to do, 
or easily successful, but it can be done. Parts of objects, such as stench, rot, 
deformation or an unexpected collapse into amorphicity, experienced as 
disgusting, can be distinguished from each other in order to exist freshly as 
motifs and supportive imagery. Entire objects, deeply disgusting both as 
things in themselves and as representations, can be transformed into art, or 
at least into challenges to received notions of art. The current American TV 
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series, Hannibal (starring the stunning Danish actor, Mads Mikkelsen), 
offers a large number of transformations in which human bodies become 
exquisite cuisine, high art, musical instruments or just about anything the 
genius of the killer can imagine. (It is worth noting that the U. S. Network 
that produces Hannibal, NBC, has canceled it, announcing termination after 
its third season, this past summer just as I began writing. A “heartbreaking” 
decision one TV critic remarked.) Successful through three seasons, Hannibal 
demonstrates the huge diversity of cultural material available for the 
construction of disgust scenarios, modifying both the obvious and the arcane. 
Reviewing Hannibal, Emily Nussbaum observes that the power of art 
possesses the ability «to make us crave something we thought we’d find 
disgusting»2. Enriching and enhancing both private stories and local 
mythology, disgust makes contempt possible as well as the many brilliant 
tales from its human archives.
                                                          
2 E. Nussbaum, “To Serve Man”, The New Yorker, June 29, 2015, p. 62. 
